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I. Introduction 
  The purpose of this paper is to examine empirically the extent to which 
households with heterogeneous preferences over the environmental attributes of 
residential locations sort themselves across a landscape. The application is to 
households on inland lakes in northern Wisconsin. We examine whether such variables 
as lake water clarity, the level of shoreline development, lake size, distance to a town 
with major services, the presence of public access to the lake, shoreline development 
restrictions, and other variables influence the sorting process.  
  There are two reasons for examining this question. The first concerns the 
management of a landscape: if a landscape is characterized by household sorting, then 
government agencies concerned with the health of the local ecosystem can tailor 
education/enforcement to take advantage of this sorting. For instance, finding that 
households with no knowledge about an invasive species such as Eurasian Milfoil tend 
to locate on a particular type of lake –large lakes with public access, for instance –
suggests that educational efforts should be directed towards property owners on such 
lakes.  
  Second, to the extent that heterogeneous households sort themselves across a 
landscape, and the location decision is correlated with other household behaviors, then 
land use policies designed to protect ecosystems may have a significant indirect, 
heterogeneous effect on ecosystems, by grouping households with similar behaviors 
impacting the ecosystem. For example, development restrictions may have the effect of 
sorting “eco-friendly” households onto different lakes than “eco-indifferent” households. 
  2Our hypothesis is that lakes where development restrictions are especially strict are 
settled by households that do such things as maintain and promote native vegetation, 
maintain the forest canopy on their property, leave course woody material (important to 
the biotic structure of a lake) in the water, and take extra precautions to avoid 
accidentally bringing invasive species in a lake.  Moreover, to the extent that land use 
policies promote the sorting process, either directly (because for some households land 
use restrictions are an important attribute of a property) or indirectly (households 
respond to the landscape effects of land use restrictions), then these land use 
restrictions may promote local collective action. 
  The next section provides an overview of the econometric model used in the 
analysis. Section III illustrates the model and its potential for informing land 
management and land use policy with a simple application to the location decisions of 
households with lakeshore property in Vilas County, Wisconsin. Section IV discusses a 
number of conceptual and econometric issues to be addressed in future analyses using 
the dataset.   
 
 
II. General Statement of the Econometric Model 
  We formulate a model in which the utility gained from a particular residential 
location is a function of both neighborhood attributes and attributes that are specific to 
the particular residential parcel. Neighborhood attributes include environmental 
attributes. The question at hand is whether –and to what extent –households sort 
across neighborhoods in response to both the environmental attributes of the 
  3neighborhoods, and the land use policies designed to protect the attributes. Our 
application involves choosing a lakefront parcel, and so in the remainder of this 
discussion, to make things concrete, we cast the household decision problem as one of 
choosing from among a set of lakeshore parcels. 
  The rental price of a parcel on lake j is given by the hedonic price function, 
  kkX Z pS k α αν = +++ jk XZ ,  (1) 
where   is the value of parcel improvements (primarily, the residence itself);  k S j X  is a 
set of observed characteristics of the lake;  is a set of observed land characteristics of 
the parcel; and 
k Z
k ν  is a stochastic term capturing price effects unobserved by the 
analyst. We specify a linear form for the hedonic price function to simplify the analysis. 
Later in the paper we discuss briefly the implication of a nonlinear hedonic model. It 
deserves, mention, though, that in previous hedonic analyses of lakeshore property, 
Papenfus and Provencher (2006) found that a linear model generates results similar to 
a variation of a log-linear model.     
  There are several ways to represent household heterogeneity in a model of 
neighborhood choice. The approach we use here is latent class (finite mixture) analysis. 
Provencher and Moore (2006) argue that the choice of latent class modeling vs. random 
parameters logit (mixed logit) depends on the analyst’s maintained assumptions about 
the nature of preference heterogeneity. Neither approach is theoretically superior to the 
other, and neither encompasses the other. We use latent class analysis to simplify the 
discussion about household sorting and its implications. By labeling each class 
according to its prominent features, it becomes convenient to talk about household 
  4“types”: the preferences of each type, the demographic features of each type, the 
implications of each type for management of the lake system, and so forth.  
  The money-metric utility obtained by household i in preference class m, on parcel 
k on lake j, is denoted by,  
  ()
mm m m
ik i k S k X Z ik UY p S β ββ =− + + + + jk XZ ϕ , (2) 
where   is household income and  i Y ik ϕ  denotes effects known to the household but 
unobserved by the analyst.  
 Substitution  of  (1) into (2) yields, 
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where  { } ,
mm m
XZ γ γγ =  is the difference 
mm m γ βα = − . 
  In our application, we do not observe , but we do observe the assessed value 
of structural improvements on the property. We assume that property tax assessments 
of improvements are correct up to a factor of proportionality and an iid error, in which 




kk SSk φ ξ = +  (4) 
If tax assessments are correct on average, then  1 φ = . Substituting (4) into (3) 
generates,  
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where  () 1
m
ik ik k S k ε ϕυ β ξ =− + − .  We assume  ik ε  is distributed iid extreme value.  
  5  Given membership in group m, the problem of the household faced with choice 
set K is, 
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XZ  (8) 
The unconditional probability of an observed location choice is the sum, over all 
preferences classes, of the product of the probability of the choice conditional on 
preferences m, and the probability of holding preferences m. The probability of 























W , (9) 
with  . The variables W 0
M φ = i include variables that predict preference class 
membership. The likelihood of the location decision k by household i is then, 
 









































  6The log-likelihood function for the sample is the sum, over all sample households, of 
.  () ln ii Lk
  At this juncture, one conceptual issue and two estimation issues deserve 
mention. The conceptual issue concerns the framing of the location decision as a static 
decision problem. In reality, we would expect that the location decision has a strong 
dynamic component due to the high cost of relocating, and in fact, including land use 
restriction variables, as we do in our application, essentially concedes this point, as the 
effects of such variables lie in their impact on future states of the world and future 
decisions. With this in mind, our model is best understood to be a reduced-form 
approximation of a dynamic decision problem, and for this reason we avoid welfare 
analysis with the model because preference parameters are no doubt conflated with 
parameters defining expectations over future values of relevenat state variables, such 





Estimation Issue: Parameter identification 
  The most obvious estimation issue concerns parameter identification. The 
parameter vector  W β  cannot be estimated with a linear model.  The parameters 
comprising 
m γ  --
m β  and 
m α –can be identified only if the prices pk are observed –they 
are not –or if the hedonic function is separately estimated. In fact, if either the utility 
function or the hedonic function were nonlinear, estimation of the hedonic price function, 
  7or observation of actual market prices,  would be necessary, because in such a case 
substitution of the hedonic price function into the utility function would not generate the 
convenient form in (3).  
  We have the data to conduct a hedonic analysis to separately identify the 
underlying parameters, and we have additional survey data that may also serve the 
purpose of parameter identification. But in this preliminary analysis, separate 
identification of the parameters 
m β  and 
m α is not a priority, because the main issue at 
hand is the sorting of heterogeneous households, for which identification of 
m γ  is 
sufficient. 
  
Estimation issue: The household choice set 
  Suppose the analyst is able to specify the neighborhoods J  from which the 
choice set faced by the household is drawn. There remains the problem of actually 
specifying the K properties available to the household at the time the location choice is 
made. It is possible, albeit expensive, to construct the choice set from public archives of 
property sales. An alternative approach is to approximate the decision problem by 
including in the choice set the actual location chosen and a random draw of locations in 
the neighborhoods J. Using the properties of the Gumbel distribution, it can be shown 
that if the set of location choices used in the actual decision is a fairly large random 
draw from the parcels in J neighborhoods, and the set of randomly chosen locations 
used in the estimation is relatively small, then the probability that the actual choice 
remains the best choice in the estimation is close to 1.   
  8  This is not quite the same problem examined by McFadden in his seminal 1978 
paper on housing choice. In the problem examined in that paper, the analyst knows the 
full set of choices faced by the household, but draws a subset of choices from the full 
set in estimation, to reduce the cost of estimation. In the problem presented here, the 
analyst does not actually know the full choice set faced by the household, but is able to 
specify the neighborhoods (however defined) from which the actual choice set is a 
random draw. The basic logic is that randomly drawing an alternative choice set in 
estimation gives correct parameter estimates if the alternative choice set used in 
estimation is relatively small compared to the actual choice set. This is the approach 
taken in the empirical analysis of the next section. The choice set for each household in 
the sample is comprised of the property actually chosen by the sample household, and 
a random draw of 30 other properties in the dataset. A more thorough presentation of 
the implications of this approach to specifying the choice set is left to later drafts of the 
manuscript 
  An important consequence of the approach is that by construction –and by 
economic theory –a latent class model with a single class will generate no statistical 
significance for any of the parameters γ . Quite simply, because every property in the 
sample is occupied by a household in the sample, and all households have the same 
preferences by assumption, then by construction no variable in the econometric 
specification of the utility function can “explain” the observed choice. This result is 
consistent with economic theory; if all individuals are the same, then the price gradient 
must equal the utility gradient. In the current context with linear utility and hedonic price 
functions,  0 γ βα =−= . 
  9  When there exist two or more preference classes, it is no longer true that the 
coefficients of  must “zero-out”. This is shown in Figure 1, where we consider the 
case of two preference classes with different preferences for water quality. The hedonic 
price gradient for water quality must lie between the utility gradient for the types, lying 
closer to the dominant type in the population (i.e., the type with the largest share of the 
population). If initially (out of equilibrium) the price gradient coincided with the WTP
m V
2  
curve, households in preference class 1 would attempt to move onto lakes with higher 
water quality, bidding up the implicit price of water quality. If instead the initial position of 
the price gradient coincided with WTP1, households of preference class 2 would attempt 
to move onto lakes with lower water quality, bidding down the price premium for water 
quality. As it stands in Figure 1, the only reason households in preference class 2 are 
on the lake system is that other attributes of lakeshore living sufficiently compensate for 
the net welfare loss they suffer from paying more for water quality than they would 
prefer.  
  An important point to keep in mind from this example is that a negative sign on 
an element of 
m γ  does not indicate that an attribute generates negative utility. Rather, it 
indicates that households in the preference class place a lower value on the attribute 
than the implicit price. Moreover, with two preference classes it is not theoretically 
possible for both classes to have a positive sign for any element of 
m γ ; the implicit price 
must lie between their respective MWTP’s for the attribute in question.      
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III. An Application to the Choice of Lakeshore Residence 
  We apply this model to the location choices of a sample of lakeshore property 
owners in Vilas County, Wisconsin, a popular vacation destination with the largest 
concentration of freshwater lakes in the world.  The unit of observation is the household. 
The data set used in this analysis consists of 502 households that purchased a 
lakeshore property in Vilas County between 1990 and 2004. Table 1 enumerates the 
variables used in the analysis. These data were derived from a number of sources: 
•  County tax rolls provided data on the assessed value of structural improvements 
to a property, mainly residences (STRUCTURE).  
•  An Internet survey of lakeshore residents conducted during the summer of 2005  
provided information on household activities (the variables CANOE, SKI), 
  11household knowledge (KNOWZONE, KNOWWQ, KNOWMIL), and 
demographics (INCOME, SEASONAL). A mail survey was used to obtain 
responses for households without Internet access, with a total response rate of 
approximately 50%.  
•  GIS maps were the source of calculations of the distance of a property’s lake to 
the nearest town with major services (DISTANCE), as well as calculations of the 
size and shoreline frontage of a property (ACRES, FRONTAGE), the measure of 
publicly-owned shoreline (PUBLIC), and the measure of shoreline development 
density (DENSITY).  
•  The Wisconsin DNR provided data on lake size and whether a lake had public 
access (LAKESIZE, ACCESS).  
•  The University of Wisconsin Environmental Remote Sensing Center (ERSC) 
provided data on lake water quality (WQ). This data was obtained from satellite 
imagery correlated with field samples. 
•  The variable ZONING was constructed from town ordinances and the Vilas 
County Lake Classification, an ordinance adopted in 1999. 
 
Table 1. Variables Used in Estimation 
Variable   Description 
T
k S : STRUCTURE  Assessed value of structural improvements to property k. 
  
j X :   
WQ  Water quality; Secchi depth in feet 
LAKESIZE  Surface are of the lake in acres 
ACCESS  A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the lake has public boat access, and 
0 otherwise 
DISTANCE  Distance to the nearest town with major services (Minoquoa or Eagle River) 
in miles 
DENSITY  The average number of parcels on the lake per 1000 feet of private frontage 
PUBLIC  The proportion of the lake’s shoreline owned by County, State, or Federal 
government 
  12MFR·DENSITY  An interaction between DENSITY and the minimum frontage requirement 
(MFR) for the lake at the time the property was purchased by the respondent.  
Interacting the MFR with DENSITY provides a measure of the effective 
impact of the MFR on future development.  
  
k Z    
FRONTAGE  The shoreline frontage of property k, in feet 
ACREs  Acreage of property k 
  
i W    
KNOW_ZONE  A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the respondent knew the minimum 
frontage requirement on the  lake at the time of purchase of the property, as 
self-reported in the survey 
KNOW_WQ  A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the respondent knew the water 
quality of the lake at the time of purchase of the property, as self-reported in 
the survey 
KNOW_MIL  A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the respondent reports in the survey 
that he knows whether Eurasion Milfoil –an aquatic invasive plant species –is 
currently present in his lake. The variable takes a value of 1 if the respondent 
answers that Milfoil is present or not present, and 0 if the respondent says he 
does not know if the species is present.  
CANOE  A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the respondent canoed during the 
2004 summer season 
SKI  A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the respondent water skis or jetskis 
(uses a personal motorized watercraft) at least once during the 2004 summer 
season 
INCOME  Respondent annual household income, in dollars 
PRIMARY  A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the property is the primary residence 
of the respondent, as reported in the survey. 
 
 
The variables used as arguments in the utility function are those used in a recent 
hedonic analysis of lakeshore property prices (Papenfus and Provencher 2005). The 
variables used to condition preference class membership,  , are preliminary, and 
represent three types of variables hypothesized to condition class membership: 
demographic variables (INCOME, SEASONAL), behavioral variables (CANOE, SKI), 
and knowledge/attitudinal variables (KNOW_ZONE, KNOW_WQ, KNOW_MIL).  
i W
Estimation Results 
  In latent class analysis there is no classical test statistic to determine the correct 
number of preference classes. In this analysis we restrict estimation to two groups for 
expositional reasons, though in current work we are expanding the number of 
  13preference classes. Results were obtained using the E-M Algorithm, with a BFGS 
gradient algorithm used in the M (maximization) step.  
  Results are presented in Table 2. They indicate that in a two-class model, the 
two classes are differentiated by the modesty of their properties and the remoteness of 
their lakes. In particular, individuals in the first preference class tend to prefer smaller 
properties with smaller structures, on lakes far from town and with no public access. We 
dub such individuals “Thoreaus”, and label the second class, “Socials” It is important to 
emphasize again that a negative sign on a variable does not indicate that the variable 
generates negative utility; the analysis does not emphasize, for instance, that 
individuals in the first preference class place negative value on structural improvements. 
Rather, the negative sign on STRUCTURE indicates they value such improvements at a 
rate lower than the market rate. In particular, assuming that structural assessments are 
accurate, the data indicate that households in the first preference class are willing to 
pay $.72 for every dollar of improvements, while households in the second preference 
class are willing to pay $1.32 per dollar of improvements. To the extent that residential 
structures are underassessed –a distinct possibility –the values of 
m
S β  are closer to 1 for 
both preference groups.   
  Interestingly, with this model we find no heterogeneity in the value placed on 
development density, zoning restrictions, lake size, water quality, and public shoreline. 
A working hypothesis underlying the paper is that environmental zoning, such as a 
lakes’s minimum frontage requirement (MFR), facilitates the sorting process and 
therefore engenders differential ecosystem dynamics, insofar as households with 
different preferences over lake attributes behave differently with respect to the lake 
  14ecosystem. Although this preliminary analysis finds no preference heterogeneity over 
lakeshore density and MFRs, it does invite one to speculate that Thoreaus behave 
differently than Socials in ways relevant to lake ecology (consider, for instance their 
apparent preference for smaller dwellings), and this in turn suggests that lakes favored 
by Thoreaus –remote lakes –will evolve differently than those dominated by Socials.      
  The conditioning variables indicate that compared to the Socials, the Thoreaus 
have lower incomes, are more likely to canoe and less likely to jet ski, are more likely to 
be seasonal residents, and are more likely to know about their lake’s zoning and state 
of Milfoil infestation.  This last point illustrates the potential for such models to inform 
lake management policies; overall, education/outreach about milfoil infestations is best 
directed to lakes close to town with public access, not only because such lakes probably 
receive relatively high boat traffic, but because residents of these lakes appear to be 




Table 2. Estimation Results 
 Variable 
Coefficient 
Estimate  Standard Error  t-stat 
       
Preference Class 1  FRONTAGE  -0.00925 0.04383 -0.21099 
  DISTANCE  0.243423 0.079101 3.077366 
  WQ  0.041547 0.046628 0.891033 
 ACRES  -0.02567  0.014783  -1.73608 
 ACCESS  -0.09495  0.157612 -0.6024 
 PUBLIC  -0.49334  0.345973  -1.42595 
 LAKESIZE  -0.01002 0.03467 -0.28901
 STRUCTURE  -0.28287 0.07963  -3.55234
 DENSITY  0.340108 0.635101  0.535517
 MFR·DENSITY  -0.24795 0.349416  -0.70961
                                            
1 This statement is perhaps too strong, as it implies the inference that property owners who do not know 
whether Eurasian Milfoil is on their lake are generally uninformed about this invasive species. Obviously, 
a survey with more detailed questions about lake ecosystem knowledge would generate more reliable 
conclusions.  
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Preference Class 2  FRONTAGE -0.00103 0.036802  -0.02789
 DISTANCE  -0.87292 0.172067  -5.07312
 WQ  0.013304 0.079968  0.166372
 ACRES  0.032784 0.017111  1.915934
 ACCESS  1.22147 0.479675 2.54645
 PUBLIC  0.680325 0.393026  1.730991
 LAKESIZE  -0.02508 0.052236 -0.48014
 STRUCTURE  0.318992 0.070075  4.552131
 DENSITY  -1.0849 1.057698  -1.02571
 MFR·DENSITY  0.268906 0.629618  0.427094
    
Conditioning 
Variables  CONSTANT 8.171296 1.718149  4.755873
 KNOW_WQ  -0.9974 0.715002  -1.39496
 KNOW_ZONE  10.65646 2.492451  4.275497
 KNOW_MILFOIL  3.128488 0.812737  3.849324
 SKI  -17.0388 3.475941  -4.90192
 CANOE  16.07207 3.216935  4.996081
 INCOME  -24.393 4.491409  -5.43104






  In this paper we present a preliminary analysis of whether and how spatial 
variation in environmental attributes affects the residential sorting of households with 
heterogeneous preferences. An important implication of such sorting arises if variation 
in preferences over environmental attributes is correlated with household activities 
affecting the local ecosystem, such as the replacement of native vegetation with lawns, 
and the removal of course woody habitat from a lake. In this case the sorting process 
may engender differential evolution of local ecosystems (lakes) with the same initial 
ecological state. The model presented here has the potential to statistically examine this 
issue, and therefore holds promise for understanding the behavioral implications of land 
use policies designed to protect local ecosystems. By facilitating the grouping of 
different types of households onto different lakes, for instance, lakeshore zoning policies 
  16may engender differentiation in the ecological evolution of lakes beyond what would be 
expected from the zoning policies themselves. 
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